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### T-USFG---1NC

#### “The USfg” means the three branches

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### “Resolved” means to enact a policy by law

Words & Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The “core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts

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Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

### Capitalism K---1NC

#### Neolib isn’t a monolithic root cause but pervasive – micropolitics disseminates post-Fordist productivity into remote terrains of lived experience to corrupt dissent.

Papadopoulos 8 (Dimitris, School of Social Science @Cardiff U, Leicester Reader in Sociology and Organisation. “In the ruins of representation: Identity, individuality, subjectification”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 47.1, ebsco//shree)

The turn to micropolitics and the dissolution of the foundationalist understandings of identity (either in its essentialist or discursive reductionist versions) enable political analyses of previously neglected and effaced domains of everyday life. But do micropolitics effectively challenge state regulation and open pathways for the emergence of a multiplicity of different modes of embodied subjectification? Or does embodied subjectification become a new mode of state regulated existence? The power of micropolitics is thought to lie in the fact that they bypass the reproduction of the state as an intact and paramount entity of power. Micropolitics harness everyday lived and embodied experience as a vital matter of political struggles which aim to reinvigorate civil society, that is, the struggles of associations of people which develop outside of state institutions (Warner, 2002). However, seen historically, since the 1980s micropolitics have increasingly become integral to the effective realization of neoliberal governance. This is because this mode of engagement is aligned with transformations which have occurred at the level of the state. The neoliberal state is not a monolithic container, rather it disseminates into the most remote terrains of everyday experience. The dismantling of welfare systems has accelerated, and finally consolidated, the state’s withdrawal from the traditional role of centralized organizer of society. However, the result has not been the disappearance of the state itself, rather we are witnessing the disappearance of the welfare state and the emergence of new one (Fairbrother & Rainnie, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Social control is primarily performed through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individual existence: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your living-room. In this process, embodied subjectification and micropolitics have become necessary elements for the functioning of the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state needs, more than self-regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation (Marazzi, 1998; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). Hence, although they arose as an attempt to challenge the overly narrow focus on the state, micropolitics have played a vital role in shifting the historical function of the state from centralized control into a disseminated form of control which operates effectively in the terrain of social and cultural life. In this sense, both state- and micropolitics articulate their political agenda inside the terrain of the state and affirm its function and centrality in social life. This is the moment where embodied subjectification and the broader project of critical psychology amplify the production of affirmative subjectivity, a subjectivity which paradoxically solidifies state regulation by operating at its margins. However, the generation of affirmative subjectivity is more than a form of political regulation in contemporary North-Atlantic societies. It is also a productive force in the literal sense. The traditional apparatus for measuring and diagnosing individual differences was insufficient as a response to the social and economical transformations related to post-Fordist labour (Bowring, 2002; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2002; Moulier Boutang, 2003; Williams, 1994). This is because post-Fordism appropriates as productive resources precisely these forms of individual action and experience, which refer to the totality of individual subjectivity: relationality, emotions, memory, communication, creativity and primarily, the totality of the body. Critical psychology’s conceptualization captures the core tenet of the post-Fordist transformation in a magnificent way: embodied subjectification becomes the algorithm for the realization of the process of the ‘subjectivization of work’, a process which lies in the heart of post-Fordist productivity (Lohr & Nickel, 2005; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; Scho¨nberger & Springer, 2003). Yet critical psychology neither traces possible ruptures in the post-Fordist arrangement nor explores everyday forms of exodus and disobedience (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Virno, 2004). In other words, the critical psychological view of subjectification can elucidate, or diagnose, the productive role of the psychology in the social earthquake which accompanied the post-Fordist reorganization of labour and everyday sociality in North-Atlantic societies (Gordo-Lo´pez & Pujol Tarre´s, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2004). However, critical psychology is unable to engage with the suppressed potentialities of post-Fordist social relations which could lead to forms of political engagement that question post-Fordism itself (Karakayali & Tsianos, 2005; Negri, 1999; Santos, 2001; Stephenson, 2004). The reason for this is, as I argued above, that embodied subjectification is the core productive form of today’s sociality. Embodied subjectification is not only a heuristic tool which enables social researchers to understand power relations in post-Fordist North-Atlantic societies, but also the very guarantor of what Weber (1978) calls ‘legitimate domination’. A form of domination which is actively and willingly performed differently by each individual and congeals a form of power, which, following Hannah Arendt (1970), emerges not as a means to dominate but by the very fact that people act together. Embodied subjectification (and its very theoreticization by governmentality studies) is a form of obedience to today’s configuration of power in North-Atlantic societies. In this sense, micropolitics and embodied subjectification constitute a form of affirmative subjectivity in neoliberal and post-Fordist conditions. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly discuss Jacques Rancie`re’s concept of politics as a means for interfering in the production of affirmative subjectivity (for a more broad discussion of this issue s. Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

#### The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Neolib commoditizes life, ensures inequality, eco-crisis

Harvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171//shree)

To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity. Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guide––an ethic––for all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a curious penchant to pursue ‘corruption’ as if it is easily distinguishable from the normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example).¶ Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contract––marriage, for example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame ‘liberals’, ‘Hollywood’, or even ‘postmodernists’ for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term commitments in their endless pursuit of profit.¶ But there are far more serious issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, ‘are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious’. While capitalism cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:¶ To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of man’s labour power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.18¶ The damage wrought through the ‘floods and droughts’ of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyi’s final point. But his theses on labour and land deserve further elaboration.¶ Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as ‘human cap- ital’) and tastes (sometime referred to as ‘cultural capital’), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers’ advantage. Conversely, workers may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely construct- ing that ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ of which Polanyi speaks.¶ Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A ‘personal responsibility system’ (how apt Deng’s language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets.¶ The second prong of attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too much can be made of the ‘race to the bottom’ to find the cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they are exposed.¶ Under neoliberalization, the figure of ‘the disposable worker’ emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: ‘unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all’.20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows:¶ We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes––especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered––until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21¶ Similar tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse ‘in which 61 workers, locked in the building, died in a fire’ received a ‘lenient’ two-year suspended sentence because he had ‘showed repentance’ and ‘cooperated in the aftermath of the fire’.22¶ Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of women’s liberation from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved). The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of women’s rights through neoliberalization has been nothing short of catastrophic.¶ So how, then, do disposable workers––women in particular–– survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. ‘I shop therefore I am’ and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the world’s disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people condemned to live on less than $2 a day, the taunting world of capitalist consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the self-congratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization, privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the financial burdens of the poor.24

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

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Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

## Case

### 1NC---Case

#### Debate is distinct from academia, in that deliberation starts with the timer and ends with the ballot---impacts about debate and the assumption the ballot has political force to remedy racism is bourgeois ideology---to think that ballots in Round 4 of the Harvard tournament change material conditions of sex workers is inseparable from the magical voluntarism they critique

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification . . . of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

#### The state is key to enact the aff---otherwise they cause hyper-individualizing which is bad

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As a feminist, I've always assumed that by fighting to emancipate women I was building a better world – more egalitarian, just and free. But lately I've begun to worry that ideals pioneered by feminists are serving quite different ends. I worry, specifically, that our critique of sexism is now supplying the justification for new forms of inequality and exploitation. In a cruel twist of fate, I fear that the movement for women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist terms. Where feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to "lean in". A movement that once prioritised social solidarity now celebrates female entrepreneurs. A perspective that once valorised "care" and interdependence now encourages individual advancement and meritocracy. What lies behind this shift is a sea-change in the character of capitalism. The state-managed capitalism of the postwar era has given way to a new form of capitalism – "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement. Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to two different historical elaborations. As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second, liberal-individualist scenario – but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves contributed three important ideas to this development. One contribution was our critique of the "family wage": the ideal of a male breadwinner-female homemaker family that was central to state-organised capitalism. Feminist criticism of that ideal now serves to legitimate "flexible capitalism". After all, this form of capitalism relies heavily on women's waged labour, especially low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities. As women have poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of the family wage is being replaced by the newer, more modern norm – apparently sanctioned by feminism – of the two-earner family. Never mind that the reality that underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels, decreased job security, declining living standards, a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages per household, exacerbation of the double shift – now often a triple or quadruple shift – and a rise in poverty, increasingly concentrated in female-headed households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation. Feminism has also made a second contribution to the neoliberal ethos. In the era of state-organised capitalism, we rightly criticised a constricted political vision that was so intently focused on class inequality that it could not see such "non-economic" injustices as domestic violence, sexual assault and reproductive oppression. Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal", feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference. The result should have been to expand the struggle for justice to encompass both culture and economics. But the actual result was a one-sided focus on "gender identity" at the expense of bread and butter issues. Worse still, the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. Finally, feminism contributed a third idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of state-organised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs. A telling example is "microcredit", the programme of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty and subjection. What has been missed, however, is a disturbing coincidence: microcredit has burgeoned just as states have abandoned macro-structural efforts to fight poverty, efforts that small-scale lending cannot possibly replace. In this case too, then, a feminist idea has been recuperated by neoliberalism. A perspective aimed originally at democratising state power in order to empower citizens is now used to legitimise marketisation and state retrenchment. In all these cases, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in favour of (neo)liberal individualism. But the other, solidaristic scenario may still be alive. The current crisis affords the chance to pick up its thread once more, reconnecting the dream of women's liberation with the vision of a solidary society. To that end, feminists need to break off our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and reclaim our three "contributions" for our own ends. First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including – but not only – carework. Second, we might disrupt the passage from our critique of economism to identity politics by integrating the struggle to transform a status order premised on masculinist cultural values with the struggle for economic justice. Finally, we might sever the bogus bond between our critique of bureaucracy and free-market fundamentalism by reclaiming the mantle of participatory democracy as a means of strengthening the public powers needed to constrain capital for the sake of justice.

#### Even positive affirmation of agency in the face of gender violence in debate creates a narrative of resilience that justifies neoliberal victim blaming – turns case

Rodier and Meagher 14 (Kristin – PhD Candidate at the University of Alberta in the Department of Philosophy, and Michelle – Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Alberta, “In Her Own Time: Rihanna, Post-Feminism, and Domestic Violence,” Women: A Cultural Review 25(2):176-193, accessed 2-8-15 //Bosley)

Susan J. Douglas (2010) argues that popular culture is a site where issues identified as points of concern for feminist activists may be explored on a broad cultural level. Television viewers, for instance, are exposed to and asked to reflect upon sexual assault and domestic violence, rape and unplanned pregnancy, sexism and racism in the workplace and in social institutions. But much of the treatment of these issues occurs at arm's length from feminist analysis. This is most certainly the case with narratives of violence against women in popular culture. Using the example of the very public discussion of violence in the wake of American R&B singer Chris Brown's abuse of Rihanna, a Barbadian R&B singer, we argue that efforts to make domestic violence ‘part of the discourse of society’, to use Oprah Winfrey's language (Winfrey 2009b), have been undermined by parallel demands to behave as a neoliberal and post-feminist subject who is encouraged to create for herself a future that does not include violence and abuse. In February 2009, international pop music sensation Rihanna was the victim of violence at the hands of her then-boyfriend Chris Brown. The unauthorized disclosure of police photographs of Rihanna's battered face and the wide circulation of the police report describing the violent attack became opportunities for American journalists and public figures to encourage women to recognize signs of violence in their own relationships and to remove themselves from sites of abuse. On the surface, such responses suggest the widespread success of feminist efforts to combat gender-based violence in domestic settings. Yet, although there are benefits to public attention to domestic violence, reportage on the Rihanna-Brown case often failed to reveal the widespread and entrenched sexism that produces and justifies domestic violence. In this paper we argue that the inadequacy of so many responses reveals that neoliberal and postfeminist articulations of gender-based violence rely on problematic temporal imperatives meant to bolster women's agency. We examine how neoliberal and post-feminist constructions of agency and temporality undermine the feminist politics of violence against women by asking young women to take on the responsibility of negotiating their imagined futures, and portraying agency as limitless and self-transformation as instantaneous. Finally, we identify how these discourses intensify norms of self-care and resilience in the face of adversity. In section one we describe the attack on Rihanna by Chris Brown and the media attention that ensued. We give a sketch of feminist scholars’ reflection on the incident and the media responses. In section two, we define neoliberalism and post-feminism, and draw out some of their racial and temporal implications. In section three we discuss media mogul and talk show host Oprah Winfrey's very public advice to Rihanna immediately following the news of Chris Brown's indictment. We argue that her advice functions to make Rihanna herself responsible for her predicament—and victims of domestic violence more broadly—through a mobilization of temporal norms of self-care and self-improvement. In section four we analyse Rihanna's interview with Diane Sawyer almost nine months after the incident of violence. Back on track, Rihanna describes how she is taking care and moving forward. In section five, we discuss how the temporal norms that thrust responsibility on to Rihanna not only ask that she take care of herself, but that she protect other future potential victims. Ultimately, in this paper, we challenge the deployment of temporal norms that make victims of violence themselves responsible for their experiences.

#### Their description of heteronormativity as a ‘monopoly’ is reason alone to reject the 1AC---they assume human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms, securing capital hegemony

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### Framing sex work as “work” represents a final stage in the alienation of labor under patriarchal capitalism

Valerie Bryson Prf. Emerita Politics @ Huddersfield ’11 in *Sexuality, Gender, and Power: Intersectional and Transnational Perspectives* eds. Jonasdottir, Bryson & Jones p. 68-70

LOVE AND WORK: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES AND CONTRADICTIONS

Although of course he did not use such terminology, in the Communist Manifesto, Marx identified an early example of the shifting relationship . between love power and work, when he talked about the bourgeoisie destroying both the feudal ties of obligation and loyalty and the personal relationships of family life, to replace them with coldly calculated self-interest and the cash nexus. This could be expressed as an earlier exclusion of love from the economy and the intrusion of the monetary relationships of political economy into private life, as proletarian children were transformed into 'articles of commerce and instruments of labour' while bourgeois men both 'see [their] wife as a mere instrument of production' and enjoy access both to other bourgeois men's wives and to working class women (1848/1983: 224).

Today, sex, procreation and care are all increasingly and directly exploited as part of the global market economy. This is bound up with the increased inequality within and between nations that has resulted from the neo-liberal economics of the last three decades. While women workers have generally provided a source of cheap and flexible labor, western corporations have increasingly outsourced production to developing nations, where wage costs can be kept particularly low by employing women and children, and many women from southern nations and eastern Europe have traveled to the west for 'vulnerable and exploitable work in nursing homes, middle-class domestic households and sweatshops' (Litt and Zimmerman 2003: 157). Along with changes in the forces of (re)production noted earlier, these developments open up new forms of exploitation of women's bodies and capacities for love. The selling of sex is of course a multi-billion dollar international industry that extends beyond overt pornography and prostitution (whether forced or 'voluntary') into mainstream entertainment and the commercialized sexualization of women's and young girls' bodies. As Jeff Hearn shows in Chapter 13, sexualized violence is central to processes of globalization. In much of the world, sexuality is now formed in societies saturated with erotic imagery and in which explicit sexual material showing the violent abuse of women is readily available on the internet. Developments in information and communications technology now enable 'consumers' in the west to direct and watch 'real time' sex shows on the other side of the world that can involve extreme violence and degradation (see Jeffreys 2009 for an account of such material and the exploitation it entails), while there has also been a rise in sex tourism and the trafficking of women to service the sex trade in western societies. 'Softer' forms of sexual services such as\_ lap dancing are increasingly treated as an extension of the entertainment industry, while prostitution is often portrayed as a form of 'sex work' that is no more inherently exploitative than other occupations and that can be seen as a legitimate choice for women. As Joyce Outshoorn shows in Chapter 8, prostitution policies in western societies are now largely informed by this assumption, while currency generated directly or indirectly by the sex industry (including through remittances sent home and its use in attracting foreign business) has become an important source of revenue in some developing nations (Eisenstein 2009).

These developments are linked to global economic trends, and are central to high levels of consumption needed to sustain economic growth, not only in terms of the sale of sexual services but also the use of sex to sell non sexual goods. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the rise of the sex industry also reflects the **reassertion** of **male dominance** at a time when this is widely seen as threatened by women's greater economic and sexual autonomy. As Ann Ferguson argued more than 20 years ago, when the increase in pornography was still far short of present levels, the rising sex industry has accompanied women's increased freedom from dependency within the home, and as such can be seen as 'a shift from private to **public patriarchy** which requires a more **collective, impersonal, male control of women's bodies'** (1989: 115). From this kind of feminist perspective, the sex industry in general and prostitution in particular should not be seen simply as forms of employment that may, like other work, be more or less exploited. Rather, they represent and reinforce men's rights to women's bodies: in the words of Carole Pateman, 'When women's bodies are on sale as commodities in the capitalist market ... the law of male sex-right is publicly affirmed, and men gain public acknowledgement as women's sexual masters-that is what is wrong with prostitution' (1988: 209; for similar recent arguments, see Eisenstein 2009; Jeffreys 2009). In many cases, sexual transactions also reassert the rights of western men to access the resources of 'other' cultures.

Related processes can be seen in the commercialization of reproductive technology. In particular, developments that facilitate paid surrogacy arrangements, so that one woman can be paid to give birth to another's biological child, represent the commodification of women's procreative power in extreme form; the selling of eggs and some forms of transnational adoption raise related issues. Paid care is also a major growth area in western societies, as people increasingly live into frail old age while women's greater participation in the paid workforce makes them less available to look after their children or other family members. This care is often provided by migrant workers, displacing the 'care deficit' onto their country of origin as they are unable to provide care for their own relatives. In all these areas, exploitation has been facilitated by the hegemony of neo-liberal economics and widening economic inequalities within and between nations. These developments have not been unopposed, as they run counter to some widely held values about motherhood, sexual morality and the role of women. The **commercialization of love** can perhaps also be seen as a **final stage of alienation**. Marx said that work under capitalism had become an uncreative, imposed, alien activity that workers cannot control, so that workers feel human only outside of the workplace (1844). Some later feminists have argued that for women, alienation is also experienced within the family and private life, where women have little control over reproduction and sexuality and little opportunity to satisfy their own emotional needs. This means that whereas for men the family is the one area of life where he can function as a human being, for women there is no relief. For these intimate relations are the very ones that are the essential structure of her oppression ... while alienation reduces the man to an instrument of labour within industry, it reduces the woman to an instrument for his sexual pleasure within the family. (Foreman 1978: 102, 151; see also Jaggar 1983)

Women's alienation within the family and intimate relationships has, however, often been disguised, because relationships within the family and private life are not usually overtly mediated by money, and the dominant ideology insists that they should be motivated by love. Because men benefit from this concealed alienation, they will often resist attempts to commercialize women's services, for this would represent a final stage of universal alienation and the ultimate denial of their own humanity. However, many will consume sexual services while vehemently opposing the idea that 'their' women should sell their bodies, thus simultaneously asserting their rights over women and 'other' groups. As with other forms of alienation, a materialist analysis sees these forms of alienation as the specific products of a particular stage in human history which could in principle be overcome, so that while technology is currently used to control women, it could be used to liberate them, enabling them to control their own fertility and make genuinely free sexual choices for the first time in human history. If, as has been argued, we see procreation and sexuality as part of the material basis of society, such 'private' alienation and its overcoming must be as fundamental as that experienced in production.

#### Antitrust law matters for every aspect of our lives, and debating the political details is essential to making it work

Bryce Covert 20. Contributor at The Nation and a contributing op-ed writer at The New York Times, 11/30/20. “The Visible Hand.” https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/david-dayen-monopolized-review/

In the morning, I shower right after I wake up. I choose from a number of products to clean myself, yet they are made by just two companies: Unilever and Johnson & Johnson. I brush my teeth with a toothbrush and toothpaste made by Procter & Gamble but sold under the separate brands Oral-B and Crest. Before I eat breakfast, because I have Type 1 diabetes, I take insulin, a drug that, because of pharmaceutical consolidation and anticompetitive patent hoarding allowed to run amok, cost about $20 for a vial in 1996 but now costs $275. Lunch isn’t any better. The peanut butter for my sandwich almost certainly comes from one of three companies; same with the jelly. We all have “choices,” but do we really get to choose?

Once you put on your “monopoly decoder ring,” David Dayen writes in his new book Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power, you start to see how this power influences every part of our lives. There’s a baby formula monopoly: Three companies—Abbott Laboratories (which makes Similac), Reckitt Benckiser (which makes Enfamil), and Nestlé—control about 95 percent of the US market. It even follows us after our deaths: Service Corporation International keeps buying up funeral homes and now earns more than $1 out of every $5 in profit from funeral services, and two companies, Hillenbrand and Matthews, make 82 percent of the country’s coffins and caskets.

Some monopolies have become so obvious that everyone can spot them. If you want to fly anywhere in the United States, you basically have four choices, all of which offer increasingly bad service. If you want cable and Internet, you usually have only one or two high-cost options and no power to fight back when the company tells you a technician will be coming anywhere between 8 am and 8 pm to set it up. If you want to search for information or buy something on the Internet, there’s one choice for each that dominates all the rest: Google and Amazon.

But monopolies crop up in all sorts of unexpected places. Match Group, the parent company that owns Match.com, also owns OkCupid, Tinder, and Hinge. Berkshire Hathaway, the holding company empire of billionaire Warren Buffett, owns brands as diverse as Duracell, Dairy Queen, Benjamin Moore, and Fruit of the Loom. The coffee brands Caribou, Peet’s, Intelligentsia, and Stumptown are all owned or partly controlled by the European firm JAB.

Our country is saturated with monopolies, but some might ask, does it matter? As Dayen shows, monopolies make it harder for workers to wield power when there are fewer and fewer employers to choose from. They make the economy less dynamic and innovative. They make society less equal, and by amassing so many resources, they are able to amass power to protect those resources. Monopolies are even a threat to our very democracy, drowning out the voices of the people.

Worries about monopolies date as far back as AD 483. At the beginning of his book, Dayen quotes Emperor Zeno decreeing, “No one may presume to exercise a monopoly of any kind.” Going as far back as the railroad barons of the 19th century, Americans have worried about the ill effects of economic consolidation. Theodore Roosevelt famously took them on as a populist trustbuster. The Granger farmers’ movement and Progressive era activists fought monopolies.

Dayen mentions much of this history, but his aim is not simply to recount it or engage in the contemporary debates over the ways monopolies warp our economy and our society; instead, he wants to spark a modern movement through real, human stories. Corporate concentration and antitrust regulation can sound like dry issues. Dayen seeks to remind us of the very real consequences they have in our everyday lives.

The stories he tells can often be heartbreaking. There’s Travis Bornstein, whose son, Tyler Bornstein, died of a heroin overdose at 23 after getting hooked on opioids that were prescribed for his elbow surgery when he was 18. Rather than call an ambulance or take him to a hospital, the friend Tyler Bornstein was with when he overdosed dumped him in a vacant lot in Akron, Ohio, and fled. “You can’t prepare to lose a child,” Travis Bornstein tells Dayen. “I felt like I failed as a father.” But the Bornsteins were failed by the rampant cartelization and concentration in the pharmaceutical industry: Tyler Bornstein’s death is one of over 200,000 related to opioids since OxyContin, manufactured by one of the Big Pharma companies, was introduced in 1996.

OxyContin, Dayen insists, is just one stark example of the dangers in an industry in which, as he puts it, “monopolies at every stage of the supply chain placed their bottom lines ahead of the health of the recipients of those drugs.” For example, “If you have glaucoma, the reason liquid from your eye drops constantly rolls down your cheeks is that companies deliberately make the drop larger than the human eye can hold. Every milliliter that falls out of your eye represents a tiny profit, and it adds up.”

Dayen also introduces us to Chris Petersen, a third-generation hog farmer in Iowa whose farm has been so battered by agricultural monopolies that his daughter, who grew up aspiring to join the family business, had to find work at a hotel instead. After several generations of farmers, “I’m it,” he tells Dayen. “This is the dead end. You know, it’s sad.” It’s hard for Petersen to compete with concentrated animal feeding operations, which shove thousands of hogs into giant feedlots without sunlight and with scant room to move, whose cost cutting has sent hog prices plummeting. As Dayen notes, four hog firms control two-thirds of today’s market.

We also meet Kate Hanni, who, with her husband and two children, was stuck on a grounded American Airlines flight in 2006 for nine hours without food or water, watching mothers use barf bags for diapers and others puke into them as the smell of overflowing bathrooms wafted through the cabin. The airline refused to let passengers off because doing so would have cost it money through mandated refunds. One claustrophobic traveler even tried to flash SOS signs through the window with his cell phone.

One might wonder if this is an isolated incident. But the entire industry is dominated by just four major airlines, and as Dayen writes, “as long as passengers have nowhere else to go, there’s no incentive to fix a perpetually broken system,” one in which long flight delays are frequent and the service gets worse and worse.

In Dana Chisholm’s quest for an affordable rental house in Southern California, Dayen gives us a story of how monopolization in real estate is running rampant: Chisholm eventually rented from the private-equity-backed landlord Starwood Waypoint, one of several Wall Street real estate companies that have become huge players in the rental market. In 2017, Starwood Waypoint merged with Invitation Homes and is now the nation’s largest rental landlord. More than 240,000 US homes are now in the hands of investors, mostly private equity firms. Because they own so many properties, these companies can jack up rents and fees while slow-walking upkeep and repairs. For Chisholm, that meant appliances that didn’t work, no running water in the sink, and a building infested with rats and roaches. When she contacted the management company, she had to wait months for repairs before getting a Zillow alert for her own house: The management company had listed it for rent even though she had just paid up.

While the stories Dayen offers take place all across the country, from rural areas to Los Angeles’s urban sprawl, and involve people in very different communities and careers, they have the same nugget of truth at their heart: When companies are allowed to keep consolidating, people lose. Without robust regulation that keeps consolidation in check, corporations will keep laying waste to our economy and our lives.

Dayen wrote his book before the current health crisis but in many ways anticipated it. Concentrated supply chains are brittle and unable to cope with major disruptions, such as a pandemic that spikes demand for toilet paper and nose swabs alike. Meat-processing giants that squeeze out smaller players through aggressive line speeds and cost cutting are now major Covid-19 hot spots, thanks to a focus on the bottom line instead of higher safety standards and humane worker treatment. “Amazingly,” Dayen writes, “news deserts correlate with the spread of infectious diseases, as epidemiologists rely on local articles to track outbreaks.”

As Dayen convincingly shows, monopolies are so interwoven in our economy and our lives that there is no escape from them. But his book also highlights some of the challenges faced by a politics that is primarily focused on monopoly. If you see it everywhere without pausing to clarify what is anticompetitive behavior and what is just plain old greed, you risk having the concept lose its specific meaning.

Dayen points a finger at the tech monopolies Google and Facebook, for example, for ravaging the media industry by bleeding advertising dollars dry through their dominance of the market. But there are also other forces pummeling the industry: Wall Street ownership, fickle billionaire backers, and smaller publications’ struggle to find new sources of revenue. Meanwhile, the media industry itself is dotted with monopolies, such as News Corp, which owns The Wall Street Journal and the New York Post and dozens of other properties; TV conglomerates that control local news; and dominant talk radio brands. Later, in a chapter on private equity, we begin to see how the problem with its quest for acquisitions is not only that it shrinks competition but also that it shifts companies’ focus from the production and distribution of goods to the maximization of money for investors. Private equity has, for example, fed upon the retail sector and spit out discarded brands like Sears and Toys “R” Us. This parasitic relationship seems to be less about monopoly power than avarice and a lack of regulation. Certainly, private equity funds have bought up companies in a number of sectors, leading to consolidation. But that’s not what happened to these retailers: The hedge funds came in, loaded the companies with debt, got fat off the fees, and then let the companies fail.

Dayen says that his book’s ambition is not to rehash economic arguments made elsewhere but to turn those arguments into a movement. But a call to action has to be clearly defined. Likewise, as liberal and left politics in the past demonstrated, alongside anti-monopolist politics must be a program of strong social policies. Breaking up health insurance cartels, for example, will help lower costs, but it won’t ensure health care for all. Anti-monopolism must define its potential and its limits and be married to other policy interventions.

There is a compelling reason to focus on anti-monopolist politics, which has garnered bipartisan support over the years. In Tennessee, Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike have tried to get rid of state limitations on municipal broadband service that were imposed at the behest of telecom giants. “We’re aligned on this issue, because it’s not theoretical, it’s practical,” says Chattanooga Mayor Andy Berke, a Democrat. “I’m a small-c conservative,” Christopher Mitchell, a researcher at the Institute for Local Self Reliance, tells Dayen. “The idea of a family moving because they lack broadband is devastating.” Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib stood with Freedom Caucus leaders Jim Jordan and Mark Meadows in demanding that a military contract monopolist return over $16 million in excess funds that it was able to squeeze out of the government. But it is where bipartisan support ends—on matters of redistribution and universal programs—that the lines are drawn between those seeking economic justice for all and those seeking merely a less tilted field.

One reason anti-monopolism is so popular among a certain set is that the solutions to monopoly power are easy to find. In fact, we often don’t need anything new. “We know how to handle monopolies,” Dayen points out, citing existing laws that can protect us against antitrust abuses but that have been misinterpreted or watered down. To him, this should be at the center of any anti-monopolist movement: restoring these laws with their original power and using them to break up monopolies, block mergers that create future ones, and regulate any that remain as public utilities. That’s all “entirely possible under existing law,” he adds.

The institutions are also in place, and not just in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (which are supposed to police monopolies and bust trusts). The Federal Communications Commission is supposed to ensure universal, high-speed Internet access under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Civil Aeronautics Board, created in 1938, used to keep airlines from getting concentrated while ensuring widespread access to travel.

But if this is all a matter of laws and regulatory bodies doing the jobs they were given, then why aren’t they? Here Dayen looks to the underlying politics of monopolization. “The mechanisms are clear,” he writes, but “getting the political class to enforce them is the stumbling block.”

#### Learning about antitrust law has important effects on our individual lives as well as broader social implications

Edward Biester 11. An attorney and a member of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law. “Understanding Antitrust Laws, Competition, the Economy, and Their Impact on Our

Everyday Lives.” Social Education 75(2), pp 68–72. https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public\_education/lookingatthelaw\_marapril.pdf

Looking at the Law: Why should anti- trust law and economic regulation be important parts of a high school social studies curriculum?

E.B.: These topics bring together many disciplines and allow students to imagine and experience their application to real world scenarios, at a time when students are learning and questioning just how the world works. Studying antitrust law and economic regulation will introduce students to concepts like the branches of government and how laws are made, enforced, and effect social policy. They allow students to take an historical view and observe how certain economic prin- ciples have emerged as economies and markets evolved. Students can decide why one rule or another would be positive or negative in scenarios that deal with their individual economic interests. These concepts also introduce students to the globalization of markets, trade, and legal governance, which will only become more important with time.

#### Neoliberal privatization of eroticism sustains white cis-het masculinity, turns case---alt is a pre-req to aff solvency.

Rowe 12 – Professor of Communication Studies at CSU Northridge (Aimee Carrillo, “Aimee Carrillo Rowe,” August 2012, Journal of Homosexuality 59(7):1031-1056, accessed 2-4-15 //Bosley)

The space of the erotic has been colonized by the heterosexual social imaginary. As Lorde (1984) explains, “the erotic has often been misnamed by men and used against women. It has been made into the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized sensation. For this reason, we have often turned away from the exploration and consideration of the erotic as a source of power and information, confusing it with its opposite, the pornographic” (p. 54). Because of its articulation to the pornographic, to evoke the erotic raises eyebrows, raises questions of legitimacy, and opens the door to the bad part of the brain where lustful thoughts remain repressed. Certainly there is a sexual component of the erotic that need not be erased from view, as hooks suggests, but the reduction of the erotic to the most banal heterosexual imagery cuts us off from the transformative charge that exists among people. This charge may be acknowledged in the private sphere, between lovers. In this context the erotic is properly mobilized for the reproduction of labor and of good citizen-subjects under neoliberalism. In the private sphere, we are sanctioned to feel the desire to strive toward another, to take a risk, to step into the unknown. The rush of energy that flows between people in such settings, however, is contained to very particular and depoliticized modes of interaction. Even when such encounters are queer, it is precisely their containment within the private sphere that renders them palatable. Markers of neoliberal inclusion—such as gay marriage and property ownership—index Western civilization over and against racialized and sexually perverse bodies, which constitute the relative outside of market virility (Puar, 2007). Of course this division of public and private begins to quiver under the intimate publicness of erotic pedagogy. The placement of the erotic safely within the private sphere becomes a site of pressure that exposes the limited notions of erotic power presumed by a public/private divide. Within such a frame the erotic is individuated and mapped onto cults of family and domesticity that contain the transformative force of the erotic. Such individuated encounters are hegemonically configured through rubrics of (hetero)sexuality, race, and class: women, especially White women, are disciplined through contradictory demands that they be simultaneously sexually available and pure, creating what Frye (2001) calls a “double bind”; the sexuality of women of color is racially coded as promiscuous and often frightening (to White men and White women) through its deviance from idealized White femininity (see Collins, 1990); and queer sexuality is abjected as unnatural on biological grounds, since the “fluids of our love” do not produce offspring (Moraga, 1997, p. 7). Thus, the power of the erotic gets directed toward White men in power—positioned as the norm (see Lorde, 1984)—as the male gaze structures relations of desire within logics of White male supremacy. Such expressions of the erotic remain bound within the private sphere, behind the closed doors of the bedroom and directed toward the purpose of reproducing normative power relations. The transformative power of deep and passionate and embodied forms of union, then, remains fragmented in homes and hotel rooms across time and space, remains directed at single individuals, as it remains contained within the popular register of love—safely shuttled to the depoliticized space of normative coupling.

# 2NC

## T-USFG

#### Affs could expand the scope of core antitrust law to include “worker welfare” allows for collective bargaining

Firat Cengiz 20. School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool. "The conflict between market competition and worker solidarity: moving from consumer to a citizen welfare standard in competition law". Cambridge Core. 10-8-2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies/article/conflict-between-market-competition-and-worker-solidarity-moving-from-consumer-to-a-citizen-welfare-standard-in-competition-law/6E783D1FC4BAB5605DFABCD17FBE3F35

Introduction

This paper offers a critical investigation of the law and economics of competition law enforcement in conflicts between workers and employers in the European Union (hereinafter EU) and the US. In such cases competition law comes into direct conflict with the principle of worker solidarity: according to the principle of market competition individuals are expected to take independent economic decisions and actions, whereas workers need to take collective economic actions and decisions to protect their interests. This conflict is particularly obvious in the context of the so-called gig economy,1 in which employers keep casualised workers at legal arms’ length to reduce labour and regulatory costs.2 If gig workers take collective action against their working conditions, they might face attack from competition law, because legally they might be considered independent service providers, rather than workers.3 The legal conundrum facing gig workers has become an increasingly popular subject in the law and economics literature.4 Nevertheless, the more fundamental question of how the enforcement of competition rules affects the overall position of workers beyond the limited case of the gig economy remains largely unexplored. This paper aims to investigate this broader and more fundamental question. In order to provide a sufficiently global answer, the paper focuses on the legal positions of the EU and US, as the leading competition law jurisdictions and primary competition policy exporters.5 The EU–US comparison shows that despite the slightly different legal tests applied in these polities, competition rules constitute nearly equally disciplining mechanisms against collective worker action on either side of the Atlantic. This paper also makes an original contribution to the emerging debate on whether and how competition law can contribute to wealth equality between citizens in the post-2008 crisis economy. The existing debate on the competition law–equality relationship takes the ‘consumer welfare’ standard as its main reference point: it focuses exclusively on the distribution of wealth between consumers and producers; as a result, it overlooks the production process that takes place before consumers meet products and services, and the position of workers within it.6 This is a natural result of competition law's reliance on a limited area of neoclassical economics called ‘equilibrium economics’ that understands efficiency exclusively as a market mechanism in which the price manifests itself where supply meets demand.7 Departing from the mainstream competition law and economics methodology, this paper builds its investigation on a holistic theoretical foundation, looking beyond equilibrium economics at labour exploitation theory as established in neoclassical as well as Marxian models. This analysis shows that despite standing at opposing ends of the political spectrum and whilst having some fundamental differences, Marxist and neoclassical models agree that collective worker action is economically beneficial and socially necessary. As a result, a critical analysis of the current legal situation on both sides of the Atlantic in light of this holistic framework illustrates how competition law's hostility towards collective worker action is not only unjust but also economically unsound. This paper demonstrates that the key problem in competition law's treatment of labour stems from the application of the consumer welfare standard in cases involving the competition–solidarity conflict without paying any attention to the idiosyncratic qualities of labour that render it naturally open to exploitation. Similarly, the consumer welfare standard overlooks the fact that consumers and workers are essentially the same group of people and one's welfare cannot be increased or decreased without affecting the other's.8 Even if worker exploitation could result in reduced labour costs and decreased prices, this cannot be deemed efficient as it reduces the workers’ welfare and results in broader negative socio-economic effects. Similarly, collective worker action resulting in higher labour costs and potentially higher prices cannot automatically be deemed inefficient, because although this might increase the prices consumers pay, they benefit from higher wages and better working conditions in their position as workers. As a result of this critical analysis, the paper proposes an original and more inclusive ‘citizen welfare’ standard that takes into account the economic effects of anti-competitive behaviour on workers as well as consumers. The citizen welfare standard could also potentially be applied in other contexts to solve long-standing conflicts between competition and other policy objectives, such as industrial, environmental and social policy objectives,9 although this paper primarily focuses on the application of citizen welfare to the competition–solidarity conflict. The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section provides an opening discussion of competition law, consumer welfare and equality. This is followed by a discussion of the economic theory of labour exploitation. Then, the paper investigates how competition law approaches the competition–solidarity conflict in the EU and the US. The fourth section critically discusses the EU and US legal positions in light of economic theory. This section also develops the citizen welfare approach as an alternative to consumer welfare for the resolution of the competition–solidarity conflict. This is finally followed with conclusions. Regarding terminology, this paper uses the term ‘worker’ (rather than employee) as a non-legal, generic term encompassing all individuals who make a living by providing labour power as a production factor in the production process of goods and services. Similarly, the term ‘labour’ is used to refer to the contribution of the workers to the production process as an abstract human factor. However, if the courts or authorities in question use a different term (such as employee) in a specific case, the paper uses the same term in the discussion of that specific case.

#### 1AC evidence agrees---it’s the only card that says the word “antitrust” and advocates for the TVA---we read blue

Moses 1AC Moon 21 [moses moon, better known on twitter as thotscholar (and formerly known as femi babylon) is a sex intellectual, guerilla eroticist, hoodoo-American conjurer, and low end theorist. she is a cofounder of the Disabled Sex Workers Coalition, and a board member at SWOP, 3-16-2021, "Symposium Introduction: Sex Workers’ Rights, Advocacy, and Organizing – Columbia Human Rights Law Review," No Publication, http://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/introduction-sex-workers-rights-advocacy-and-organizing/]//comradeken

Turning now more profoundly to the intricacies of a theory for our liberation, issues of age, race, class, sex, gender, and disability are complicating a movement previously dominated by white, middle class, higher-end perspectives. First, erotic laborers are a broad mélange of libertarians, neoliberals, radical leftists, socialists/communists, conservatives, and anarchists.[37] Second, and relatedly, the juxtaposition of decriminalization and legalization and discriminatory “models” that criminalize certain aspects of sex work have yielded a wide range of imprecise terms such as “full decriminalization.”[38] Some high end escorts would prefer to remain independent contractors, while others, myself included, have advocated for accessing labor protections by forming cooperatives or unionizing—although formal unions are not available to independent contractors due to antitrust laws.[39] I have also discussed brothels at length, positing cooperatives as a solution to the problem of madams and cis-heterosexual male brothel owners. None of these solutions is even close to being perfect. And, of course, this is all being discussed under the guise of the continuation of capitalism. In the words of anarchist Pedro Ribiero, “only the oppressed can liberate themselves.”[40] This means that much of our work may have to be accomplished without appealing to the State. Defunding the police and waging class struggle, along with advancing racial and gender equity, are a huge part of our work.

#### The aff is in opposition to Section 230 in that they seek to leave sites unmoderated as per the 1AC---that’s the opposite of topical action because it reduces the scope

Darley Maw, 20, 7-24-2020, "DOJ Takes a Stance on Section 230 Reform that Could Place Additional Burdens on Online Platforms," Antitrust Advocate, https://www.antitrustadvocate.com/2020/07/24/doj-takes-a-stance-on-section-230-reform-that-could-place-additional-burdens-on-online-platforms/

By way of background, Section 230 shields websites from legal liability for posts, including comments, images, and videos, of third-party users. At the time this legislation was passed, the Internet was vastly different from what it is today. In the ’90s, as the tech world was beginning to grow, Congress sought to encourage that growth through statutory protections. Section 230 provides websites with immunity for posts left by users, and allows for “Good Samaritan” protection from civil lawsuits if websites remove or moderate posts that they consider to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”[4] This way, websites can still “clean up” posted content without having to worry about being targeted via lawsuits for choosing to police and self-regulate their own domains, so long as they do so in “good faith.”

## Case

# 1NR

## Capitalism K

#### Neoliberalism depends on the nuclear family and binary gender roles to extract profit – only an economically equitable society solves

Miles 14 (Laura – UCU activist and SWP member, “Transgender oppression and resistance,” in International Socialism, 1-9-14, Issue 141, <http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=944>)

It is the material circumstances in which we are required to live under the capitalist system which distort and limit everyone’s gender role and gender identity by seeking to constrain us within a binary gender straitjacket in a system dominated by the ideology of the nuclear family. As a result we are all alienated,25 to a greater or lesser extent, from each other, from ourselves and from our true humanity. Trans people are highly motivated to resist that gender straitjacket, which suggests that, while gender identity may not be fixed and unchanging, it is deeply rooted in us; otherwise trans people could presumably be socialised out of our gender variant behaviour and identity. Everyone, after all, is showered in cot-loads of gender conformative reinforcement from the moment of birth. Conversely, this also suggests that in a saner and freer world many different gender expressions and arrangements for living together could be possible outside the nuclear family structure and the gender binary. The nuclear family is crucial to capitalism for the continued accumulation of profit, as will be discussed later. One of the greatest cruelties of capitalism for all oppressed people is that it possesses the practical and material potential for our liberation from oppression. Yet by its pursuit of profit maximisation the ruling class is driven to deny the possibility of such fulfilment to the vast majority of the world’s population. It follows from this approach that for Marxists “the trans person” is as much a social construction as “the homosexual”, traceable to a particular (but not the same) historical period, mode of production, and material conditions. One of the problems with essentialist views is that they ignore such changing material circumstances and tend to regard the ideas of a given period as having always been just so, ie they are both idealist and ahistorical. On the contrary, Marx argued that ideas in society emerge from the material circumstances of the production of goods and necessities and from the reproduction of labour power itself. As material conditions change, so will the prevailing ideas. The existence of considerable gender variant desires and behaviour in very many societies, from pre-history to the present, is well documented.26 Based on this evidence we can claim with some confidence that transphobia has not always existed. It was the development from hunter-gatherer clan societies to patrilinear class societies, and more recently the emergence of capitalism and the nuclear family, which led to the increasing oppression of women, gays and transgender people.

#### Local to Global Bad – the question of this debate is which model translates collectives to overcome commoditization of dissent – the perm that scales up from “local” to “global” gets the direction of causality wrong by mystifying how world economies structure local relations – misdiagnosis turns solvency.

Engel-Di Mauro 9 – Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

Despite the emphasis on multiple scales of analysis, ‘‘webs of relation” (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007), ‘‘chains of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 27), ‘‘bottom-up” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 82), or ‘‘progressive contextualisation” (Vayda, 1983), most of the work in political ecology privileges spatio-temporally limited social contexts over longer-term, macro-scale social processes (Bridge, 2002, p. 371). While this may be the outcome of a recent distancing from political economy perspectives (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 611), the problem was inherent from the very beginning, with a tendency to emphasise the ‘‘regional” or meso-scale (and then ‘‘local”, or micro-scale) as the starting unit of analysis. This analytical centring of smaller-scale dynamics has resulted in an inability to integrate general patterns and interconnections with ethnographic and eco- systemic data (Blaikie, 1999, p. 140; Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 612). This is far from saying that micro- or meso-specificity is less important than macro-specificity (the two are equally important in my view). Micro- and meso-level analysis is pivotal in under- standing people–environment relations, especially given that the most tangible occur largely over small areas. Yet emphasis on the smaller scale becomes a hindrance when it guides, rather than builds the empirical foundations of a research project. With few exceptions, political ecology continues to suffer from a methodological insis- tence on explaining people–environment relations through the analysis of smaller-scale circumstances and/or starting points. Planet-wide environmental and, since at least 500 years ago, social processes enable and/or constrain smaller-scale people–environment relations, especially with recent human-induced shifts in atmosphere composition (radiative forcing through greenhouse gas emissions, stratospheric ozone layer disruption through the emissions of bromines and chlorofluorocarbons, regional releases of atmospheric pollutants through burning vegetation and coal com- bustion, etc.). The scale of analysis adopted in a research project may depend on the kind of question one wishes to answer (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 65), but ultimately larger-scale processes must be included to arrive at explanations that go beyond appeals to complexity (Blaikie, 1985) or beyond eclecticism in the frameworks being combined (Blaikie, 1999, p. 139). The matter is exacerbated when phenomena in some parts of the whole are confused for evidence that negates either the existence of the entire system (or of any systemic process at all) or denies the possibility of a general theory on resource management (e.g., Black, 1990; Forsyth, 2003). There are other epistemological repercussions from such small locality-specific analyses and small-to-large scale approaches. One is treating places (or regions) as isolatable (often implicitly, by not paying attention to wider systemic processes), which enabled political ecology to circumscribe the range of social and environmental contexts to those far away from most political ecologists’ homes (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2004). The underlying problem was reflected in the exclusion of places outside rural ‘‘third” world areas from the purview of political ecology (countries in the former state-socialist camp are still mostly ignored).2 Recent attention to wealthy industrialised capitalist societies and urban ecosystems is a helpful first step in moving political ecology away from a relatively narrow focus3 and into more promising cross-comparative terrain that can generate more systematic analy- sis (see works guest edited by Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2006).

#### Labor link---branding sex work as labor/ ‘work’ assumes the commodification of sex work resolves it’s harms---it directly precludes an ability to imagine a world where sex isn’t labor, and entrenches gendered dynamics freezing status quo heterosexual division of sexual labor---turns their impact.

Mary **McINTOSH** Sociology @ Essex (Founder, Feminist Review; UK Gay Liberation Front) **’96** “Feminist Debates on Prostitution” in *Sexualizing the Social* eds. Lisa Adkins & Vicki Merchant p. 200-201

This emphasis on prostitution as work - as an occupation like any other - has affinities with the early feminist recognition that being a housewife is a job and that mothering and caring for the old, the sick or the disabled are also work. 'Every mother is a working mother', as a slogan of the late 1970s put it. It also echoes the feminist recognition that many of women's abilities, such as manual dexterity, sewing, or a good telephone manner, are not classified as skills in the world of employment, so that women's work is less highly valued than men's, and less well paid (Phillips and Taylor, 1980; Elson and Pearson, 1981). The old-fashioned terms 'working girl' and 'pro' are pre-feminist in this respect. They suggest a contrast with the 'amateur', seen from a men's point of view, who gives sex away for nothing. So what marks the prostitute as a pro, or as working, is that she charges for it. From this pre-feminist perspective, an unpaid activity does not count as work. In a feminist context, then, the term 'sex worker' carries a double load: it means that these are women who are paid for what they do, who earn their living by sex, but it also means that, as with other women, what they do should be respected as a skilled and effortful activity and not considered simply as a natural capacity of every woman. This brings us back full circle to the 'Wages for Housework' position on prostitution. For the idea that all women are prostitutes in the sense that all heterosexual relations involve trading sex for financial support, leads to the idea that women should be paid for it in money, rather than in a more nebulous exchange for dependence. Just as housework is only respected if it is paid a wage, so having sex with men can only be respected if it is paid for. So in this view, prostitutes are more admirable than other women because they are more frank about what they are doing and never sell themselves cheap.

But this analogy also reveals a weakness in this hard-line pro-prostitute position. The 'Wages for Housework' position was early criticized for freezing the division of labour and condemning women to cleaning, cooking and childcare as their occupation. From the perspective of feminist households that were trying to share these tasks equally among all their members, the 'Wages for Housework' solution would prematurely foreclose on what they saw as a progressive move towards abolishing sexual difference. In addition, in so far as these households had a communal ethos, they encouraged the idea of mutual interdependence and doing things for the social good rather than for monetary reward. Similar criticisms can be applied to prostitution, from the perspective of a feminism that sees a future in a greater freedom and women's pursuit of sexual pleasure, as well as recognizing that the sexual arena is at present one of danger and exploitation for women (Vance, 1984).

Paid prostitution freezes the sexual division of labour in relation to heterosex and condemns women to doing sex as a service to men rather than for themselves. In recognizing, and perhaps rather exaggerating, a current reality it forecloses on more progressive efforts to transform the heterosexual world.

#### Eroticism Link---it’s localism is depoliticized---even if eroticism is interpersonal or communal, neolib frames its dissent

Rowe 12 – Professor of Communication Studies at CSU Northridge (Aimee Carrillo, “Aimee Carrillo Rowe,” August 2012, Journal of Homosexuality 59(7):1031-1056, accessed 2-4-15 //Bosley)

This depoliticization of the erotic through its location to individually directed manifestations is one mechanism of the broader cultural framework of individuality that is predominant within the U.S. Segrest (2002) explains, for instance, how this U.S. culture addresses pain and healing—always at the level of the individual, which erases its connection to the socio-political. Segrest observes the connections as follows: The business of therapy, both professional and self-help, has emerged in this century in the United States to deal with the psychological damage, which in a culture structured around scarcity and profit happens to people first in the context of our racist, sexist, and homophobic families. But these therapies are highly depoliticized. This failure of therapy to take into account the political causes of personal and family distress is another factor that insulates White people from realizing the damage we suffer from racism and therefore from realizing our own stake in changing racist systems for ourselves, as well as for people of color. (p. 160) I would add that all folks of privilege learn themselves into boxes, which are then unable to hold them, and unable to nurture them. The degree to which subjects constitute their identities through these untenable individuating practices that seem to garner success within neoliberalism also marks the condition of alienation within late capitalism. Indeed it is the very process of individuating healing—which is social, political, communal—is necessary to shore up the logics of competition and historical amnesia in which neoliberalism thrives. I have observed men and women of privilege who seem to be walking around as if in living coffins—dead in this life—because somehow the purview has become too small and the cost to self and others too high. I have been trapped within and also witnessed such living deaths of my students: the various abuses to which they subject their bodies—anorexia, drinking binges, drug abuse—to escape the unnamed pain that they are injesting through our culture of scarcity. Lerner (2000, citing Gabel, 2000) argues that traditional systems of education function through the separation of “actual emotional situations and ethical and spiritual concerns that fill our real lives” (through their measures of success, such as the SAT) and rewards those who “are best able to make this disconnection” (p. 237). In other words, success for students trained in the U.S. schooling system, particularly under neoliberalism, relies upon the disassociation from one's self, community, body, passions, spirit. For instance, the trauma to which queer teens are subjected by students and teachers marks queer sexuality as aberrantly public and out of place, violently asserting difference as trauma, as dissociation, on the queer body. The work to live fully within and against the context of late capitalism, when subjectivities are produced through violence that then must be ignored, is the most clear meaning I can glean from Spivak's (1990) continual charge that we must “unlearn our privilege as our loss” (p. 9). These connections render visible what is at stake in maintaining the erotic as an exclusively private space: to contain the transformative possibilities held within uses of the erotic and to direct those energies toward the reproduction of the state and transnational capitalism. When the erotic makes its way beyond the secret crevices of our own homes and into the public sphere, its transformative force is contained on a number of fronts. The primary mode of containment is to capture this force within various rubrics of abjected sex—pornography, prostitution, public scandals. Stories of these forms of public eroticism titillate the public imaginary. Popular media outlets thrive on stories of the seedy power of a Hollywood Madame and the intimate details of sex scandals. As Berlant (1997) has so insightfully argued, the effect of the U.S. preoccupation with scandal, or privatized citizenship, is that the public sphere becomes a space inappropriate and indeed inhospitable to collective acts of outrage, organized responses to oppression, and public dissent. We have seen this containment strategy at work in the lack of coverage to post-9/11 protests, including some of the largest peace-time protests in the history of the world prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Such global forms of resistance are not news, but Monica Lewinsky, OJ Simpson, and other sexually scandalous figures will continue to fill our television screens. Certainly there is a palpable force that the erotic asserts, even in its most reductive form, for we cannot seem to turn away from these stories. Yet, this coupling, of the communal emergence of the erotic with repudiated sex forms, deflates the resistive interpellative power of the erotic by shrouding it in shame. In other words, this logic takes up the ongoing ideological and affective work of banishing the erotic to private and interpersonal manifestation and repudiating public manifestations as pornographic. The containment of the erotic is works through a conservative hegemony invested in maintaining the distinction between the public and private spheres.

#### It’s a new link---they are the notion that “we can’t change the world, so we must train ourselves to adapt” – this ontological commitment forecloses systematic transformation

Joseph 13 – Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield (Jonathan, “Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach,” Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 1(1):38-52, accessed 2-8-15 //Bosley)

Resilience, therefore, can be related to the way that societies adapt to externally imposed change. The ecology literature is concerned with the impact of global environmental change, but this could also include economic crisis and terrorist threats. The adaptive capacity of social systems depends on the nature of their institutions and the ability to absorb shocks.5 Crises can actually play a constructive role in resource management, forcing us to consider issues of learning, adapting and renewal.6 This idea is picked up in the political literature. A pamphlet from the British think-tank Demos suggests that we think of the concept of resilience, not just as the ability of a society or community to ‘bounce back’, but as a process of learning and adaptation.7 Similarly, the World Resources Institute defines resilience as ‘the capacity of a system to tolerate shocks or disturbances and recover’ and argues that this depends on the ability of people to ‘adapt to changing conditions through learning, planning, or reorganization’.8 The document even goes so far as to define resilience as the capacity to thrive in the face of challenge.9 Elsewhere,10 I have argued that most contemporary social theories contribute to an ontology that renders the world governable in certain ways. These ontological commitments are certainly not reducible to the political practices and indeed can be found across a range of disciplines including ecology, geography and various intersections of social and natural science. Whether these philosophies go under the descriptions of ‘new materialism’, ‘complexity theory’, ‘network analysis’ or ‘reflexive approaches’, they share a set of ontological commitments. The idea of resilience fits neatly with these ‘new’ ontological commitments. It assumes a world that is increasingly complex but also contingent. Stable and enduring social relations are believed to have given way to complex networks of actors, each with their own individual pursuits. Our social engagements have no necessity to them; they are what we make of them and blend with our own particular narratives. And in order to survive the uncertainties of complex systems, people have to show their own initiative as active and reflexive agents capable of adaptive behaviour. Although these philosophies are not reducible to political practices, it is easy to see how they might lend themselves to particular ways of governing. Rather than challenging a series of mistaken philosophical commitments, the rest of this paper will concentrate on the political consequences of such ideas. In particular, on how these approaches conceptualise the social order in such a way that is consistent with neoliberal practices of governance. A belief in the contingency and complexity of adaptive systems supports the sociological view that society is moving away from enduring social relations based on such things as class, nation-state and social identity in favour of a view of the world as comprising individualised consumer-citizens with their own life-pursuits. Resilience fits with a social ontology that urges us to turn from a concern with the outside world to a concern with our own subjectivity, our adaptability, our reflexive understanding, our own risk assessments, our knowledge acquisition and, above all else, our responsible decision-making. Although we started with ontological assumptions about the bigger social world, we arrive at a view by which the best way to govern society is through a greater awareness of our own behaviour. Indeed, a major claim here is that the way resilience works, certainly in Anglo-Saxon approaches, is to move fairly swiftly from thinking about the dynamics of systems to emphasising individual responsibility, adaptability and preparedness. For the reasons above, I study the concept of resilience through the lens of governance in order to see how and why it has entered the political vocabulary. More than this, it is through a Foucauldian understanding of governing that we learn most about what the concept of resilience is actually doing. For example, Zebrowski11 notes that resilience is better understood, not through its own claims about the changing nature of security threats, but instead as an indication of the changing organisational structure of the advanced liberal societies. O'Malley, meanwhile, notes that resilience is not just a reactive model that teaches people how to ‘bounce back’, but also acts as a means to create adaptable subjects capable of adapting to and exploiting situations of radical uncertainty.12 In the ‘Resilience as governmentality’ section, I argue that this fits with a neoliberal mode of governmentality present, to varying degrees, in the advanced liberal societies. Resilience supports the organisational structure of the advanced liberal societies through its assumptions about social relations, and it supports the idea of the neoliberal subject as autonomous and responsible. It helps embed that subject, particularly in relation to processes of governance. Hence, my approach to the concept of resilience is not a philosophical one. Indeed, I will argue that the term lacks any proper philosophical meaning and that to write a philosophical paper on resilience is dangerous given the way the concept works. To put it differently, the meaning of the term is derived from its position within a particular discourse which is itself related to practices of governance. To develop a philosophical account of resilience would be to give this discourse a credibility it does not deserve and to ultimately legitimate a set of practices of governance. My approach to the concept of resilience is to see it in relation to these practices. It has been plucked from the ecology literature and used in a fairly instrumental way to justify particular forms of governance which emphasise responsible conduct. As the ‘Resilience as governmentality’ section argues, it works alongside a set of similar ideas in order to create this effect. Its rise to prominence is the result of being in the right place at the right time. Contemporary conditions have given rise to certain practices of governance by which the idea of resilience finds a home. Whether this continues to be the case remains to be seen, but it could well be that as these practices are modified, refined or even challenged, the term itself my lose its influence. Although I wish this journal every success in performing an important service to intellectual debate, the political side of me wishes for something different! Resilience as governmentality To make sense of the rise of resilience, we have to see it in the context of new discourses of governance. This is not the place to go into detail about approaches to governance and whether or not we are really seeing a shift from government to governance or from traditional governance to multi-level, complex governance. Critics argue13 that the issue is not so much the newness of forms of governance, as the new emphasis placed on them by and the fact that one of the key effects of the discourse of governance is to conceal the continuing reproduction of hierarchical power relations. My argument here is that this discourse can be critically examined by looking at it through the lens of governmentality. Although Foucault's approach has its limits in terms of its ability to speak to the big picture, it provides a lot of the fine detail necessary for understanding how concepts play a role in constructing governable spaces. Resilience, it is argued, is one such concept. Foucault's work on governmentality emerges in a series of lectures that engage with a number of linked themes such as biopolitics and the governance of the self. We could spend an endless amount of time trying to work out the most authentic interpretation of Foucault's ideas. Or we could admit that Foucault's work is an evolving and unfinished product and that his approach is deliberately evasive, elusive and provocative. Opting for the latter, I therefore propose to interpret Foucault in a way that best fits with an understanding of dominant forms of governance in the world today. Of course this does not do justice to the richness and diversity of Foucault's ideas, but I will leave it to others to justify the superiority of a different interpretation. The main issue I am concerned with here is the emergence and embedding of specifically neoliberal forms of governance. And in doing this we can help explain why resilience places so much emphasis on things such as individual preparedness, making informed decisions, understanding our roles and responsibilities, and showing adaptability to our situation and being able to ‘bounce back’ should things go wrong. These fit with neoliberal approaches that put emphasis on the responsibility of the individual to govern themselves in appropriate ways. Foucault's lectures point to a number of shifts in discourses and practices of power and rule. These are caused by the development of capitalism and demographic change and, therefore, take population as their main concern. Although disciplinary power works directly on the body to place it under constant supervision and surveillance, a new form of power, governmentality, works from a distance through a liberal rationality of governance. Some analysts of Foucault's work would emphasise that although Foucault's concept of governmentality does tend to highlight liberal practice, it is far more wide ranging than this.14 My view is that although this may be true, there are good reasons for Foucault to concentrate on liberal forms of governmentality, and even better reasons for those of us who want to look at the dominant forms of governance in the world today. Foucault is interested in liberal forms of governance because he is trying to understand the newfound concern with population and its relation to the development of capitalism in certain Western countries. Hence he highlights the way these forms of governance operate through promoting the ‘natural processes’ of the economic sphere.15 The rationality of liberal government stresses the need to respect the freedom of economic processes through deliberate self-limiting of government.16 For Foucault Laissez-faire governance, based on the liberal principles of political economy, finds its expression in civil society and is legitimated through the liberal concern that one must not ‘govern too much’.17 Liberal rule looks to the private sphere and civil society as a way to disguise the imposition of ‘market discipline’ as somehow an exercise in freedom. Neoliberalism extends this process through the artificial (often forced) introduction of competitive practices in more and more spheres of social life.18 Part of this process is the neoliberal assault on the institutions of the post-war settlement and the promotion of the norms and values of the market as a means of ‘destatification’. Hence we might expect the intensification of governmentality's emphasis on limiting government and governing from a distance by encouraging free conduct. But the second part of this process involves the embedding of these norms and values in a new set of social institutions and practices. Tickell and Peck19 describe this as the ‘roll-out’ phase of institution building which reflects a shift from the earlier, more aggressive ‘roll-out’ phase, to a new emphasis on normalising the logic of the market through softer ideas such as public–private partnerships, networked governance and an individualised conception of civil society based on mobilising active citizens. Neoliberalism's promotion of free market norms is therefore much more than the simple ideology of free-market economics. It is a specific form of social rule that institutionalises a rationality of competition, enterprise individualised responsibility. Although the state ‘steps back’ and encourages the free conduct of individuals, this is achieved through active intervention into civil society and the opening up of new areas to the logic of private enterprise and individual initiative. This is the logic behind the rise of resilience. In the process of constructing and interpellating neoliberal subjects, neoliberal discourse and practices appeal to them as citizens or consumers who are ‘free’ to take responsibility for their own life choices, but who are expected to follow competitive rules of conduct. Governmentality works by telling us to be enterprising, active and responsible citizens. Neoliberalism works through the social production of freedom and the ‘management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free’.20 Resilience contributes to this through its stress on heightened self-awareness, reflexivity and responsibility. It encourages the idea of active citizenship, whereby people, rather than relying on the state, take responsibility for their own social and economic well-being. In particular, it focuses on the risk and security aspects of this by encouraging preparedness and awareness. An important way in which resilience encourages heightened self-awareness is through constructing a picture of a world that is beyond our control. This sounds like a contradiction because it might create a sense of resignation. But the resilience argument is that even if we cannot change the world, we can survive better through knowing how to adapt. Hence although resilience appears at first sight as a systems theory, its main effect is to emphasise the need for adaptability at the unit level. The conservative ontology behind this (the political acronym is TINA or there is no alternative) is shared with a range of other contemporary social ideas such as reflexive modernity, risk society, network society and information age, all of which posit the idea that we must change our behaviour and adapt to things beyond our control. The ecology literature is clearly more sophisticated in how it theoretically argues for adaptability. Most of the policy documents, security strategies and think-tank papers make brief reference to the origins of the concept in this literature, but then ignore it. From the policy perspective, all that matters is the idea that we live in a changed world. A study of the security literature, for example, reveals that the argument barely gets beyond the idea that 9/11 shows the changing nature of threats faced. The last thing these documents want to do is engage in a complex philosophical discussion about adaptive systems. They are concerned, primarily, with justifying new forms of governance and are driven less by systems thinking than by an individualist bias.

#### individualized survival, resistance, and intimacy all operate within market forces

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Neoliberalism is the proverbial elephant in the room when it comes to liberal discourses on queer emancipation. There are several political-economy definitions of what it is and why it is dangerous, n40 but we would like to work with a tentative definition that understands neoliberalism as 'the cultural technology of disciplining conduct'. While capitalism as an ideology puts into operation a political formation of governance like liberalism, neoliberalism is the condition where practices of liberalism get naturalised, internationalised and internalised by individuals who inhabit liberal or liberal-aspiring state formations. Culturally, neoliberalism has very smoothly done three things to ensure its robust and brutal longevity: first, it has enabled the mutation of the state into a firm; second, it has given birth to the responsibilised and self-governing citizen; third, it has constantly projected experiences [\*12] of human precarity and risk as entrepreneurial/ developmental/ funding opportunity. These three ramifications of neoliberalism on human minds and bodies have had arresting consequences on the idea and practice of legally claiming LGBTI rights. n41 The new mantra of citizenship under neoliberalism is one where every individual is told that they can be citizens with rights as long as they perform certain prescribed codes of respectable citizenship which are for their own good. Under neoliberalism, the script of this seduction is not a preserve of the state any longer but authored under the demands of transnational market forces. The promise of integration is a difficult temptation to resist for those who have historically been outside of the folds of formal citizenship. Not being integrated is to not be treated as a citizen with rights and being incorporated into the folds of citizenship might afford you rights but those rights also result in initiating a unique form of self-surveillance and regulatory technology. Pharmakon redux. So what exactly does the seduction of the state/ market complex do to the queer person? As Jasbir Puar in her reading of the situation in the US notes: [T]here is a transition under way in how queer subjects are relating to nation-states, particularly the United States, from being figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families). The politics of recognition and incorporation entail that certain -- but certainly not most -- homosexual, gay and queer bodies may be the temporary recipients of "the measures of benevolence" that are afforded by liberal discourses of multicultural tolerance and diversity. This benevolence towards sexual others is contingent upon ever-narrowing parameters of white racial privilege, consumption capabilities, gender and kinship normativity, and bodily integrity. n42 The experience in India will not be very different where Naz marks this flashpoint moment of integration and it will not come as a surprise if the terms of recognition for queer subjects are predicated on the hegemonic constructs of the Hindu nation, the heteronormative Indian family and the universal image of the chic, entrepreneurial and consumer citizen -- one who is both culturally and economically disciplined to serve the ends of neoliberalism. Brenda Cossman pithily captures the characteristics that this newly crowned sexual citizen will fashion: [\*13] They are experts in the arts of self-conduct. And they shop. Their citizenship is sexualized beyond heterosexuality, commodified through a celebration of market consumption, and domesticated through a new emphasis on the intimate sphere not only as a site for caring for others but for care of the self. They are citizens who are sexed but not too much; citizens who not only consume but better yet, teach each other to do so; citizens devoted to the conduct of self and other improvement [...] The process of becoming citizens is one that operates its own technologies of inclusion and exclusion and constitutes subjectivities through these technologies. I argue that the new modality of sexual citizenship is one that is privatized, domesticated and self-disciplined. n43

#### Self-Invention Link---The aff is individualist focus on “choice” that’s abstracted from materialism –also enforces neoliberalism’s repressive politics of personal responsibility

Phipps 14 (Alison, Professor of Languages and Intercultural Studies @ U of Glasgow, The Politics of the Body: Gender in a Neoliberal and Neoconservative Age. Google Ebook//shree)

The marriage between postmodernism and feminism has been a particularly fruitful one, allowing the movement both to challenge claims to 'objectivity' in mainstream social science, research and policy focused only on men's issues and needs (Haraway 1989; Fausto-Sterling 1992; Martin 2001) and to examine its own limitations in terms of the use of fixed, universalist identity categories such as 'woman' and claims on this basis to speak for all women (Butler 1999). Feminists have also been particularly attracted to postmodern accounts of agency, which is produced by the subject's situation inside a matrix of discourses which, through the performative nature of identity, they are capable of beginning to rework from within (Butler 1988, 1999, 2004). Much contemporary feminist theory situates agency in the body and in resistant and radical forms of 'body work' (Butler 2004). This includes postcolonial feminism, which has an especial focus on practices of bodily resistance, often reclaiming cultural norms and traditions previously defined as shaped by oppression (Bilge 2010). The ideas of agency and ' choice' are important in all the debates covered in this book: however, while acknowledging that there is much to be gained from these concepts, I also draw on critiques of this contemporary orthodoxy as having become, in interaction with neoliberalism, rather voluntarist and individualist (Livia and Hall1997: 8; Webster 2000: 8), and abstracted from structural determinants (Abu-Lughod 1990; Brickell 2005; Boucher 2006). Furthermore, I attempt to highlight important, if unintentional, convergences between such feminist mainstays and the neoliberal emphasis on 'personal choice' and self-invention, which can very quickly turn into a more repressive politics of personal responsibility.

#### Sexual deviance link---sexual acting out is impotent to challenge the reach of capital---instead of solipsistic struggles, we must vertically and collectively organize.

Cornell & Seely 16 – Drucillia Cornell J.D., Professor of Political Science at Rutgers; Stephen D. Seely, PhD candidate in the Department of Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers [*The Spirit of Revolution: Beyond the Dead Ends of Man*, Polity Press, 15-18]

This form of sexual "politics" is largely a response to the perceived "sex negativity" of U.S. culture which, according to Gayle Rubin, views sex with an automatic suspicion and hostility (2011: 148). For us, however, the left-queer, feminist, and socialist-has, by and large, failed to adequately grapple with right-wing sexual moralism in the U.S., which is generally written off as merely a sign of ignorance and intolerance, and responded to by the proliferation and celebration of sexuality as a mode of resistance. For example, homosexuality has long been read by those on the right not only as a form of decadence, but as spreading a type of "infection" throughout society as a whole. One response to this within queer theory is that the transmission of a queer infection to the social body is all to the good because, through an identification with the death drive, queers have the power and possibility of disabling the heterosexist foundations of the social as a whole (a claim we address extensively in Chapter 3). The problem, for us, goes much deeper than this to something that most feminist and queer theorists seem loath to acknowledge: the legitimate fear of ethical collapse that precipitates such virulence against queer subjects, a fear that takes a tremendous toll on the majority of people living under conditions of neoliberal capitalism (see Cornell 2005). In the face of this, a "politics" of sexual acting out seems rather impotent, if not itself part of the problem. As a result, we want to "return" queer and feminist theory to revolution as the only ultimate solution to the rightful terror that comes with living in a dying empire, with all its violence (including sexual violence), its decadence, and the disintegration of anything like a shared ethical world that promotes what Michel Foucault called "the care of the self and others" (1988).

To be sure, however, any revolution must include a profound confrontation with sexuality, or rather, something greater than "sexuality": the erotic. In this chapter, then, we assemble a genealogy of well-known thinkers to argue that a fundamental transformation in erotic life has "always" been a part of both feminist and socialist politics. Moreover, all of the thinkers in this long and important "tradition" also implicitly recognize that unless we completely undo the reign of Man-including phallocentric heterosexism and the reproduction of the species as it is currently configured-then communism will be nothing but an "empty signifier" (Laclau 1996) or "Idea" (Badiou 2010). As such, these thinkers highlight erotic transformation as a crucial dimension of what Paget Henry has identified as the "vertical dramas of consciousness" that are independent from but necessary to the "horizontal ... dramas of nationalism, proletarian liberation, and societal reorganization" (2000: 121). The "vertical" revolution, in Henry and other Africana and Caribbean philosophers, involves the deep transformations in the psyche that would enable one to live and engage differently with others in a world beyond colonialism, capitalism, and, as we are arguing here, phallocentric heterosexism. Throughout most of the genealogy we trace in this chapter, the "vertical" and "horizontal" revolutions-erotic restructuration and socialism-remain explicitly and inextricably linked. Erotic structuration, in other words, could never simply take the form of "sex," and there could be no autonomous "sexual revolution" independent from the struggle against capitalism. This is markedly different from much of the queer and postfeminist theory of our postrevolutionary times in which the erotic has been reduced almost entirely to sex, and the revolutionary struggle for a different way of living together has been almost entirely abandoned.

Our central purpose here, then, is to review this "revolutionary tradition and its lost treasure," to borrow a phrase from Hannah Arendt (2006), and in doing so, to aim and fire at a branch of contemporary theory that has explicitly dissociated itself from revolution and, worse yet, from the life-affirming joy that lies at the very heart of what would motivate us to try to change the world together in the search for different forms of erotic relation beyond Man. Perhaps some of these recent theorists have it right, according to the tradition that we will discuss, given that within the constraints of advanced capitalism any affirmation of being sexual or sexuate otherwise will falter before the dictates of a dayto-day life under exploitation, leading us to believe that there is nothing "queer" we can possibly do other than embracing the death drive. Yet, of course, none of the writers in the revolutionary tradition would ever have thought that there could be any "freed" sexuality or different sexuation unless the dictates of modern capitalism were completely undone in the collective struggle to achieve communism. Simply put: if "pleasure" is defined merely by whatever quick fuck you can fit in while working 86 hours a week, then no wonder pleasure seems like an embrace of the death drive, because who can put in that kind of time? And yet, why is it that the death drive, melancholia, and the forms of "psychosis" that have been celebrated in the queer literature are so rarely linked directly to the brutalities of life under capitalist exploitation? This point is certainly not lost on any of the revolutionary thinkers that we will discuss, all of whom explicitly connect all forms of psychic collapse to the capture of our individual and collective lives by phallocentrism and capitalism. We thus want to strongly insist that the turn toward "anything goes" sexual pleasure-seeking found in both queer and postfeminist theory completely misses what was best in the thinkers who insisted that revolution must be thoroughgoing in all aspects of life-including the erotic-if it was to be at all worthy of the name of a communist life together. In other words, if part of capitalist exploitation includes the sexual commodification of what Foucault (1990a: 158) calls "bodies and pleasures," then the struggle for communism must include the undoing of that commodification. Therefore, to challenge the norms around sexuality-either in the name of being "anti-bourgeois" or in the name of "queerness"-cannot take place without a challenge to the commodifying grip of what we call "sexuality" itself, as well as to the intimate connection of sexuality with capitalism. True love and the transition to socialism, we argue, entails an insistence that there is simply nothing revolutionary about a blow-job.